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BILLS OF RIGHTS AND
REGRESSION TO THE MEAN
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK*

Lawyers overstate the importance of law in general and constitutions in particular. Judges are the worst sinners. It is natural to suppose that your profession is vital to society, and that
its central tenets are most important of all. No wonder a group
of lawyers is assembled on this bicentennial of the Bill of
Rights, which most lay persons and many lawyers conceive as
the core of the Constitution rather than James Madison's afterthought. I have come as a wet blanket, equipped with a skeptical view of the importance of elderly laws.
Political and economic culture have more to do with our liberties than does the written word. It is not constitutional language but civic culture, including education and (relative)
toleration for differing views and practices that separates the
United States from nations where none of us would want to
live. Madison, whose silhouette is the emblem of the Federalist
Society, wrote our Bill of Rights but thought it a sop to opponents of the Constitution. He doubted the value of his amendments in part because he thought that the bulwark lay in the
political institutions created by Articles I, II, and III, and in
part because he feared that to list withheld powers could support an inference that other powers had been granted
(although the Ninth Amendment allayed that fear).' His dominant sentiment, however, was one to which Learned Hand has
given the best expression:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are
false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in
the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law,
no court can even do much to help it. While it lies there it
needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.... [I]n a
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
The Law School, The University of Chicago. This essay is a revised version of a talk at
the annual meeting of the Federalist Society on March 2, 1991, and is © 1991 by Frank
H. Easterbrook. I thank Keith R. Dolliver, Richard A. Posner, Cass R. Sunstein, and
Charles F. Webber for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See generally Paul FinkelmanJames Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity,
1990 Sup. CT. REv. 301.
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society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the
courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will
perish.2
Madison believed that constitutions exercise their influence
through the structure of government they establish and by influencing public aspirations and sentiment, not through the
force ofjudicial decisions. He was more concerned about intolerance by the States than by the national government, for he
expected the difficulty of assembling like-thinking, repressive
coalitions to diffuse factions.' Yet his Bill of Rights did not apply to the States. No wonder, then, that Madison expected few
controversies within the ambit of the Bill of Rights, and he was
not surprised. Until he had left the White House, the Supreme
Court did not decide a single case under the Bill of Rights. 4
Despite the profusion of constitutional litigation in this century, Madison's Bill of Rights remains peripheral to our daily
lives. 5
Why is this? One reason is trite: The Supreme Court follows
the election returns. Not in any crude sense, but indirectly because the political branches mold the Court by appointing justices whose views reflect conventional wisdom about wise
governance. There is enough plasticity in the Bill of Rights and enough forgetfulness about our constitutional historythat the Constitution has been remade in contemporary image
several times. The justices themselves cannot escape their upbringing and the culture surrounding them; few today can even
imagine a time when persons were treated as property, and
when the ordinary business of modern government would have
been seen as rollicking infringement of the rights of property.
2. This quotation combines parts of two similar expressions by Hand, the first from
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES BY

LEARNED HAND 189-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960), and the second from THE CONTRIBUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY TO CIVILIZATION (1942), repinted in id. at 164.
3. See FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
4. The first is Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819), which held
that Congress did not violate the Seventh Amendment when providing for the application of Maryland law in the District of Columbia. Maryland dispensed with ajury trial in
the case at issue. Madison died on June 28, 1836, before the Supreme Court decided
another case under his Bill of Rights. He did, however, veto a statute that he believed
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See 22 ANNALS OF
CONG. 982 (Feb. 21, 1881), reprintedin 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITrTION 99 (Phillip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
5. My skepticism about the importance of law, as opposed to political culture, puts
me in the company of my distinguished colleague Cass R. Sunstein, whose Three Civil
Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 765-69 (1991), I commend to you.
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The remaking of the Constitution does not yield perfect concord with modem sensibilities. Sometimes the Constitution assumes a form that is dead politically but survives in
superannuated justices. Sometimes the Constitution is cast in
the image of Francis Bacon's New Atlantis, as justices who think
they understand what right-thinking persons will want tomorrow attempt to have a constitution ready for them when
they get there. We have seen enough of these varieties of
change to doubt that it is Madison's Bill of Rights being implemented in any period, as opposed to some vision of morality
and sound government being vindicated in its name. Legal
views of the Constitution regress to the mean of modem
culture.
Consider our track record. This nation got along without a
Bill of Rights until this century. Until the Court absorbed the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth in 1897,6 none of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights had been applied to the States. 'Until the
1960s things remained that way. The "incorporation debate"
did not start until the 1940s. As for the federal government:
The Nineteenth Century expired with few applications of the
Bill of Rights. The first declaration of unconstitutionality in the
name of the Bill of Rights was a fiasco. It was Dred Scott. 7 Chief
Justice Taney declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, asserting that "an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely
because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law." The "property" to which he referred was a human being; adding insult to injury the Court
skipped lightly over the fact that the word following "due" is
"process", yet Dred Scott laid claim to a power of substantive
review. More such "victories" for the Bill of Rights would have
jeopardized our claim to be a civilized nation.
Let us put to one side the more than fifty years during which
the Court thought most social welfare legislation inconsistent
with the Constitution and turn to the last few decades. During
6. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
8. Id. at 450.
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the 1960s, when the Supreme Court applied most provisions of
the Bill of Rights to the States, it was not directing the States to
do anything unusual. The federal Bill of Rights was assembled
from provisions in state constitutions.9 Almost nothing the
Court told the States to do in the 1960s was not present already
in the organic law of the great majority of them. The Court was
dealing with outliers, not changing the rules under which most
persons lived.
Spectacular counterexamples will be adduced to refute
claims of the sort I have been making. Brown v. Board of Education'O comes first in any such list. No one can deny Brown's importance to the struggle for racial equality. You must put Brown
in perspective to understand the claim that the Bill of Rights
(broadly understood to include the three Reconstruction
Amendments) has transformed the nation, however.
When it was politically unthinkable that public institutions
would be integrated, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires no such thing." Thoughtful persons believe
that decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson legitimated and helped
support the Jim Crow movement; others believe that at all
2
times the Court did what it could to assist African-Americans.'
Be that as it may, not until integration began to be thinkable
did the Court take a few tentative steps in that direction. 13 At
about the same time President Truman issued an executive order desegregating the armed forces. 1 4 By 1954 political support for integration had grown enough that the Court believed
an order might be obeyed. Only then did it issue Brown-after a
re-argument at which the Eisenhower Administration weighed
in supporting the plaintiffs. Brown gave the civil culture a push,
but only a mild one. The Court adopted the formula "all delib9. See

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE

87-90 (1977).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78
(1927).
12. I take no side in this debate. For contrasting positions, compare ALEXANDER M.

AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS

BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THEJUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21 Ch. 8 (1984), with Ran-

dali L. Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor
Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Missouri exrel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
14. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948).
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erate speed,"' 5 and places that complied at all emphasized "deliberate" over "speed." The Supreme Court tolerated grade-ayear and freedom-of-choice plans until 1968, when it finally
16
said that desegregation must occur forthwith.
What happened between 1954 and 1968 was not a development of constitutional jurisprudence. It was the passing
through school of an entire cohort of children. The Court
"grandfathered" those immediately affected by the case. What
else happened? A dramatic change in the political culturesome of which Brown fostered, but much of which supported
Brown. In 1957, for the first time since Reconstruction, Congress enacted a civil rights law. 1 7 Seven years later came the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and on its heels the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. Public demonstrations and the eloquent voice of Rev.
Martin Luther King, Jr., spurred action. Economic growth led
business to line up against laws that hampered the choice of
employees and reduced workers' intellectual capital. By 1968
the political branches were ready to support the end of segregation. They were, indeed, ahead of the Court. It was not judicial decisions but the threatened withdrawal of federal funds
that brought about the collapse of segregation in the 1960s and
early 1970s. The dominant federal role in paying for state government-through which so much federal power is deployedhas nothing to do with the Bill of Rights but stems from the
Sixteenth Amendment, which gave Congress the power to levy
income taxes. That power, plus Madison's observation in Federalist No. 10 that the national government is less prone to capture by faction than are state governments, was more important
in undermining official discrimination than were the decisions
of the Court. In the end civil rights were achieved under the
force of statutes.' Segregation was a moral offense, and its
elimination required a moral and political debate, the outcome
15. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
16. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The Court tolerated antimiscegenation laws until about the same time. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 174 (1962) (discussing
Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), which allowed these laws to persist while the political heat was high).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634.
18. See GERALD N. ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABouT SoCIAL CHANGE? 42-169 (1991) (describing both the limited effects of Brown and the
social forces that ended segregation).
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of which would be enforced by political and economic actors. It
required a change in our civic culture.
Religion is another' potential counterexample. Did not the
religion clauses of the First Amendment protect us from established churches and sectarian warfare? Most unlikely. The First
Amendment sailed through Congress because there was no
sentiment for establishing a national church. The religion
clauses were not applied to the States until 1940,19 yet the
seven States that ever had established churches gave them up
in the Nineteenth Century.20 Look at the other western democracies-the places from which some of our forbears fled in
search of religious freedom. Even nations such as the United
Kingdom and Sweden that retain their established churches
have establishment in name only. Swedish citizens can have exemption from the church tax on request. England, whose established churches were a source of great bloodshed, still has two
established religions (the Churches of England and Scotland),
but neither is a source of oppression. Change came in Europe
as a result of economic development and the tolerance toward
others that flows from an interdependent society. It is hard to
attribute equivalent tolerance in the United States to a Constitution that is missing in other nations that have undergone the
same fundamental developments. Which is not to say that the
religion clauses have no consequences-paradoxically, one of
their principal effects may be to increase the extent of religious
21
belief.
Let me essay one more challenge to accepted wisdom. Roe v.
Wade,2 2 which restricted governmental interference with abortions, is a common example of the importance of constitutional
adjudication. So you would think from the public debate. But
before giving assent to the proposition, you would want to
know how many abortions would have been performed in the
19. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause). Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), is the first application to the States of the
Establishment Clause.
20. They were Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia. None of the seven ever had the sort ofpreferential establishment, coupled with punishment for nonbelievers, that led to bloodshed in Europe.
See LEONARD W. LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25-62 (1986).
21. See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 54-59 (1989).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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absence of that decision. Roe was a thinkable decision only because public toleration of abortion was growing in the 1960s
and early 1970s, and a substantial political movement supported liberal abortion laws. Several States had relaxed their
rules,2 3 and the number of legal abortions in the United States
began to increase rapidly in 1969. In 1972, the year before Roe,
there were 587,000 legal abortions.2 4 In 1973 there were
745,000-and it is unlikely that Roe had much effect on that
number, because it took a year or two for the abortion clinics
that perform most of the abortions newly authorized by the
Court to enter business. Abortions had been increasing at a
rate of some twenty-five percent per year in the early 1970s.
That rate of increase diminished after Roe, falling to twenty-one
percent in 1974 and fifteen percent in 1975. Of course these
were increases from a bigger base, and by 1980 the number of
legal abortions topped 1.5 million. (It has been stable since.)
My point is simple: If you looked at a graph with time on one
axis and the number of abortions on the other, you could not
spot Roe and would have no reason to think that anything out
of the ordinary happened in 1973-the curve is smooth.
Judges spend a good deal of their time explaining what they
are not saying. I am not saying that Roe was unimportant. It is a
landmark opinion, and it authorized abortions that doubtless
would not have occurred had the matter been left to politics.
But had there been no Roe v. Wade, the political fight would
have proceeded, and I think it likely that most States (certainly
California, New York, and the other largest States) would have
continued to allow abortion more readily. To understand the
effect of law, you must look at effects on the margin. In other
developed nations with radically different constitutions, abortions became more available during the 1960s and 1970s without judicial action.2 5
This may become clearer if you think about current events.
Two years ago the Supreme Court issued an opinion enlarging
23. Some of these developments are described in Richard G. Morgan, Roe v. Wade
and the Lesson of the Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1726-30 (1979), and
Comment, A Survey of the PresentStatutory and Case Law on Abortion: The Contradictionsand
Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 177.
24. These data come from Rosenburg, supra note 18, at 180. I round to the nearest
thousand. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 766 & n.51 (reaching the same conclusion using
other data).
25. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 10-62,

145-54 (1987).
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the scope of political choice over abortion.2" Two jurisdictions
(Louisiana and Guam) have seized on this to reinstate their old
laws; a handful of other States have enacted more complex reporting and parental notice rules; legislatures in one or two
other States have tried to act but have been unable to overcome vetoes. But the dominant effect has been extended debate and little or no action.
My home state provides an illustration. Every two years Illinois would enact some anti-abortion law, expecting the courts
to hold it unconstitutional. Governor Thompson routinely vetoed the bills on constitutional grounds; the legislature routinely overrode the vetoes. Debate was desultory; everyone
knew that in the end nothing would happen. After the court
obliged by holding the law unconstitutional, the legislature
would produce another. When Webster came down in June
1989, members of the legislature realized that courts just might
enforce what they were enacting. This produced panic-and, after the panic, stasis. No new laws have been enacted. The Attorney General of Illinois compromised the pending litigation
on terms favorable to women seeking abortions.27 Illinois was a
jurisdiction firmly in the anti-abortion camp so long as it was
clear that its laws did not matter. Now that laws matter once
again, legislators have engaged in responsible debate and been
more tolerant than either supporters or opponents of Roe believed they would be. The increase in civic responsibility is one
of the virtues of a decision such as Webster.
Law is full of assertions, but where is the proof? One way to
test propositions of the kind I have advanced is to look at state
constitutions. The language and history of these constitutions
differs. Before the application of the Bill of Rights to the States
in the 1960s, did the different constitutions produce discernable differences in civil liberties among the States? I have not
encountered a claim that they did. A second way to test the
importance of constitutional language is to ask whether the text
and history of the Bill of Rights itself matters. The two hundred
years of constitutionalism has been two centuries of homogenization, of regression to the mean, as precise or sweeping language is watered down and vague language used as a
26. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
27. Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1991).
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receptacle for modem views. 2" The Takings Clause applies
only to the federal government, the Contracts Clause only to
the States; the Supreme Court's cases read as if both clauses
apply to both levels (and neither means much, as they protect
disfavored rights in property). The Equal Protection Clause applies only to the States, yet the Court routinely speaks of the
"equal protection component" of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment-more than a linguistic oddity, as the
Fourteenth Amendment contains both due process and equal
protection clauses, a redundancy if equal protection is instinct
in due process. A right to travel has been teased out of the interstices of the Constitution, and other rights (the Second
Amendment, for example) have faded.29 Judges exercise preferences in deciding which parts of the Bill of Rights to apply to
the States; the Seventh Amendment and the GrandJury Clause
of the Fifth have never been incorporated. The status of the
Bail Clause of the Eighth is ambiguous. Modern application of
the Due Process Clauses, emphasizing "fundamental" rights,
leaves judges with great discretion to deem particular practices
or interests fundamental and so expand or contract the constitutional rule. The "balancing" so much in vogue amounts to
the denial of law and the assumption by judges of the power to
say what is reasonable.3 0 What is reasonable varies as conceptions of The Good (or at least the tolerable) change.
One more warning about what I am not saying. Only a fool
would deny that decisions under the Bill of Rights have affected
many persons' lives, that some decisions created substantial
change, and that our nation's focus on "rights" (and legalism
in general) influences our civil culture deeply. I am not here to
take on Tocqueville! What I do suggest is that these effects are
less substantial than most people believe, that other nations
have had comparable developments that cannot be attributed
28. If you believe that Roe shows the Court to be more important than I portray it, you
may still think that Roe casts doubt on the importance of the Bill of Rights. Roe was
unsuccessful in locating its rule in the text, structure, or history of the Bill of Rights-as
opposed to medicine, ethics, and the interests of the pregnant women. That Roe is not a
traditionally legal opinion is common ground among all partisans.
29. See Chicago Board of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 742-45 (7th Cir.
1987); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, I 1 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 53

(1988).
30. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1129-30 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., I I S.
Ct. 2456 (1991); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE LJ. 943, 972-78, 986-92 (1987).
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to our Bill of Rights (on which more below), and that effects on
the margin beget counter-effects. Think for a moment about
Miranda v. Arizona,"' which obliged police to give the famous
four warnings if they wish to use in criminal prosecutions statements obtained during custodial interrogation. Miranda's list
tracked procedures the FBI had adopted voluntarily, but the
sanction of exclusion was new. Other nations have not followed
suit. Miranda affected police behavior (interrogation became
more civil) and has led to the dismissal of many prosecutions
(and has dissuaded prosecutors from filing others). Has Miranda strengthened the hand of suspects against the state? That
depends on how political society responds. If a decision such as
Miranda makes it harder to investigate crimes and to prosecute
guilty persons (there will be fewer confessions, some of which
will be suppressed), crime becomes more attractive. How does
society maintain the deterrent force of the law? By increasing
the sentences of those caught and convicted. It is no accident
that the United States both extends suspects more rights and
imposes longer sentences than other western nations. The net
effect of fewer crimes solved and longer sentences for persons
who are convicted may be the same level of deterrence, but a
different distribution of the costs of crime. Persons whose constitutional rights are respected by the police, and who then are
convicted, spend more time in jail, while persons whose rights
were violated avoid criminal sanctions. It is not pellucid that
suspects as a class perceive this redistribution as a benefit. No
bill of rights, no judicial decision, can ensure net benefits for suspects when the political branches control elements such as the
penalty for crime.
To examine more fully the question how much bills of rights
influence society, you must look outside the borders of the
United States. You will find nations with dramatically different
constitutions and judiciaries but roughly similar levels of economic development-and as it turns out personal liberties
quite similar to ours. This congruence suggests that something
other than words on parchment accounts for our liberties.
The United Kingdom has no constitution and no judicial review. But its independent judiciary emphasizes the importance
of the rule of law, as have a long succession of governments.
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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it
Canada tracked the United Kingdom until recently, when 32
adopted a bill of rights-with a "notwithstanding clause."
That is, notwithstanding- a decision by the Supreme Court of
Canada that a statute violates the bill of rights, a province may
reenact the law. It has only to assert its power, and set a time
limit on the life of the statute. You may think this shocking, but
it has rarely been used. What you may find even more shocking
is that the United States, too, has a notwithstanding clause. Article III allows Congress to decide whether there shall be any
inferior federal courts. It could abolish these courts tomorrow,
and thus remove most of the national capacity for judicial review. Article III also allows Congress to make "exceptions" to
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That power
implies, at least in principle, almost total control over the judiciary. Yet Congress has tried this avenue so infrequently that in
200+ years the Court has not decided how far Congress could
go if it pleased. 33 Abstinence from what could be the nuclear
bomb of constitutional adjudication shows the importance of
political culture. President Roosevelt failed to pack the Court
for political reasons, not constitutional ones; jurisdiction-stripping bills fail for political reasons, not constitutional ones.
Let us return to other nations. Germany has a bill of rights
and a constitutional court, which exercises judicial review. Very
little of the judicial power has been expended defending civil
liberties as we understand them today; the court held abortions
unconstitutional (in Germany the fetus has a constitutional
right to protection from unjustified abortions); many decisions
are distinctly Lochner-ian, protecting commerce from regulation.3 4 Still, civil liberties in Germany look much like our own.
France has a constitution without a bill of rights, and although
it has a constitutional court it lacks judicial review as we know
it. The Conseil Constitutionnel may review proposed laws only
during the brief interval between enactment and entry into
32. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 33.
33. The extent of this power is a subject outside the scope of this essay. For a
thoughtful discussion, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of theJudiciaryAct of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990), and the commentaries by DanielJ. Meltzer, The
History and Structure ofArticle II, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569 (1990), and Martin H. Redish,
Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretationof Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1633

(1990).
34. See David P. Currie, LochnerAbroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 333.
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force, and then only at the request of a select list of political
figures. Once a law has become effective, no court in France
may refuse to enforce it on constitutional grounds. Yet France
recognizes rights quite like our own. By the way, the lack of a
bill of rights in the French constitution has not stopped the
Conseil Constitutionnel from finding rights. It has declared
that the Declaration of the Rights of Man, a document of the
French Revolution, is part of the constitution of the Fifth Republic! (This is a lot like our Supreme Court suddenly discovering that the Declaration of Independence is part of the Due
Process Clause.) As European Community courts have begun
to assert jurisdiction over national tribunals, they also have begun to recognize as part of Community law rights culled from
national constitutions and the European Convention on
Human Rights.3" The fundamental similarity across developed
nations in both formal statements of rights and practical liberties-despite substantial differences in written constitutions
and judicial systems-implies that the written documents are
not responsible.
Professor Merrill offers a counterexample: During the Persian Gulf War, England imprisoned many Iraqi nationals, and
the United States did not.3 " He attributes this to differences in
our constitutions. If we were going to point to differences I
would start with the Official Secrets Act, showing that the
United Kingdom affords the press less protection than do we.
Differences are inevitable; I do not claim that liberties are identical across nations, only that the similarity is too great to depend on bills of rights. Professor Merrill's example, though, is
weaker than he believes. During World War II the United
States impounded U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry, and the
Supreme Court held this action permissible." Aliens have
fewer rights than citizens. Indeed, as a close approximation
aliens have no constitutional rights against the national government, although they possess rights against States (the Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "persons" rather than
"citizens"). Justice Frankfurter's remark that "the right to ter35. See T.C.

HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN INTRO-

DUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-

NrrY 223-25 (2d ed. 1988).
36. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Role of InstitutionalFactorsin ProtectingIndividual Liberties, 15 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 85, 86-87 (1992).
37. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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minate hospitality to aliens ... [is] wholly outside the power of

this Court to control""8 remains an accurate statement of the
law. 9 Accurate though this is as a -statement of law, it is not
accurate as an understanding of our civic culture. Congress has
created for aliens, despite their inability to vote, a set of procedural and substantive entitlements far exceeding anything the
Constitution requires. These entitlements come from a widely
shared view that aliens are entitled to dignity and respect as
persons-and this even if we do not see them as tomorrow's
citizens. This cultural view, and not any constitutional command, made a dragnet of Iraqi nationals unthinkable in the
United States.
My advice to you is to exercise caution in evaluating claims
that bills of rights are important in themselves. The Framers
were right to call them parchment barriers. It takes a tolerant
political and economic culture to nurture individual liberties,
to support claims of personal freedom. Our nation has used the
judiciary and our particular Constitution as one embodiment of
this tolerant spirit, but alternate institutions are conceivable,
and used effectively, in other nations. The ability of political
society to create and protect many different institutions to the
same end implies that the United States would have adapted
too. It is important to understand these alternatives, even
though the Bill of Rights is our civil religion.

38. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
39. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (quoting this passage with
approval).
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